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Some of you will be aware that in 1994 the Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) official policy of accepting and investigating UFO sightings, or “Unusual Aerial Sightings” (UAS) as they called them, was massively downgraded to almost nothing at all. I knew there would be a paper trail (beyond what was already released years ago) which hadn’t been appraised before. In September, 2015, using the powerful Freedom of Information (FOI) Act, I submitted a detailed request to the Department of Defence (DoD) for any material that “went into” this policy downgrade. They issued me, at some cost, 42 pages of never-before-seen administrative records from that era. This is the third and final Part of this series. For those who wish to start from the beginning, have a look at Part 1 and Part 2.

By Paul Dean The UFO Chronicles 2-7-16

Beyond what I have highlighted previously, there are some more records that are of some interest. A 3 page “Message Form” dated 24th December, 1993 was sent to six “Air Indicator Groups” (AIG). An AIG is a list of preset destinations for internal message routing. This particular message was titled “Unusual Aerial Sightings: Revised Policy” and had a file reference 138/93/DGPP. DGPP stands for Director General of Plans and Policy. The author was Air Commodore S. T. James who was DGPP for the RAAF in 1993 and 1994. See below:


Another item which is of note is a reference copy of RAAF Headquarters document which forms a front cover sheet to the dry UAS Policy as it stood in 1984. Indeed, it was 1984 when the RAAF had last changed the policy when they made the decision to cease investigating any and all sighting submitted to them. Only sightings deemed of possible defence or security significance were to be studied. Anything less was simply logged, with a courtesy letter written to the witness. So, what did the 1984 policy look like when crammed into one page? Signed by Air Vice Marshal, J. W. Newman, who held the role of Deputy Chief of the Air Staff from 1984 to 1985, see this outline of the 1984 UAS Policy below:

- click and or right click on image(s) to enlarge -

I could continue providing textual transcription and imagery of this significant piece of Australian DoD history, but this series needs to be finalized, and anyone who wants to study the records provided to me merely needs to ask. It is absolutely worth other researchers having a look at this material. I have taken much away from these records, and, if nothing else, it proves that the RAAF can locate and prepare 20 year old records with what appeared to me to be relative ease. Also, in regards to the redactions of text found in this release, on the 17th of January, 2016, I appealed the DoD’s FOI decision makers and asked for the blacked-out text to be released in full. I expect an answer by February’s end.

Finally, one very last piece of history that I wish to share is a copy of the RAAF’s 6 page UAS Sightings Annex A, parts 1 and 2. Part 1 was the actual pro forma questionnaire for witnesses to fill out if they so wished; and Part 2 was the Unit Investigation form, which was a RAAF officer’s “investigation” working papers for any given case. These clean, blank forms are how they appeared in the 1980s and early 1990’s. See below.



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In 1994, the Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) policy of accepting and investigating UFO sightings, or “Unusual Aerial Sightings” (UAS) as they called them, was downgraded to virtually no policy at all. But, like all things in modern government, there had to be a paper trail. In September, 2015 I submitted a Freedom of Information (FOI) request to the Department of Defence (DOD) for any material that “went into” this policy downgrade, and I was recently provided with never-before-seen administrative records from that era. I have discussed some of these records in Part 1 of this series, which can be found here.

By Paul Dean The UFO Chronicles 1-29-16

In this Part 2 of the series, I aim to continue providing imagery and discussion regarding this important release of information. In Part 1, the main item I studied was Wing Commander (later Group Captain) Brett Biddington’s (ret) lengthy draft of background information and suggestions which would soon morph into the 1994 downgrade of their UAS policy. One surprise was the level of security classification on much of this material. I also emphasized that some of it remains classified, and has been redacted (blacked out) so it could be released to me.

So what of RAAF Biddington’s final draft for the Chief of Air Staff? At 7 pages long, it differs somewhat from the first draft that Biddington wrote. Firstly, it has a cover page as one may expect, and is somewhat more formal, as we shall see. Firstly, the front cover page has “COVERING SECRET” stamped squarely in place. The title states “BREIF FOR CAS” – “CAS” is the acronym for Chief of Air Staff. Below this is “UNUSUAL AERIAL SIGHTINGS POLICY”. And in the bottom left, is the all-important “Brief prepared by WGCDR B. Biddington.” I have imaged this above.

The next page is has SECRET stamped at the top, as well as “Page 1 of 7” directly underneath. Below that is “DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE” and “(AIR FORCE OFFICE)”. A line of text referring to the existing UAS policy states “Ref: AF 84 3508 Pt l (14)” and is followed by a center-of-page heading “BRIEF FOR CAS” and “UNUSUAL AERIAL SIGHTINGS – POLICY” underneath. The first sub-section is headed here, not surprisingly titled “BACKGROUND,” along with the remaining pages below:





Now that I have presented the final copy of the massive policy change material that the Chief of Air Staff saw and approved, it is worth having a look at the differences between WGCDR Brett Biddington’s draft and the final product. The draft, which can be examined in my Part 1 of this series, is shorter in regards to page numbers. This is because the line spacing and text is more tightly packed. Also, the final product for the Chief of Air Staff came with a front cover. The level of detail that Biddington goes to in the two products is somewhat different, also. Most importantly for us is the text that discusses RAAF interest in Unusual Aerial Sightings, especially around what I believe to be discussion on re-entered space debris and new (at the time) long-range aerospace surveillance.

For example, in relation to an “extra-terrestrial threat” to Australia, the draft version states on Page 2:

I think that an extra-terrestrial threat to Australian security is not likely to develop without some foreknowledge from astronomical and other surveillance systems. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X The means by which such searches might be conducted are numerous and will vary with particular circumstances.

Compare that to the same topic in the final version, on Page 6:

Should unambiguous extra-terrestrial contact with earth occur (which may or may not be associated with UAS), however remote that possibility might be, levels of organisation well beyond the RAAF will be interested and involved. Should the RAAF be required respond, how we do so will be defined not by extant UAS policy but by instructions from Government. It follows that there is no valid reason for the RAAF to retain a formal interest in UAS.

In the draft version the redacted text is, I believe, most likely discussing long-range radar systems (and possibly other aerospace monitoring technologies) that were being evaluated or in initial stages of operation back in the early 1990’s. In the final version, the “extra-terrestrial threat” isn’t mentioned until Page 6. Also in the final version, there is an extra segment in the “RAAF Interest” sub-section which is worth an extra look and comprises lightly of material in the draft, as well as new discussion:

The enormous improvements in surveillance technologies in the past 20 years make it possible to predict when large items of space junk are likely to fall to earth and where they are likely to fall; this occurred with SKYLAB in 1983. Civil and military aviation communications in Australia are highly developed and initial indications that an aircraft is in difficulty are increasingly likely to come from within the system and not be dependent on external observation of flaming wreckage and falling debris. Witness observations of such events remain important but not from the UAS perspective.

Another difference between the two versions of this policy change material, although small, is the reference to the vanishing of pilot Frederick Valentich and logistical concerns. Paragraph 5, Page 2, of the draft version reads:

At a more mundane level, the UAS mechanism has provided information about missing and crashed aircraft. The disappearance of the pilot Valentich into Bass Straight (flying a Cessna) is a case in point.

Paragraph 8, Page 3, of the final version reads:

At a more mundane level, the UAS mechanism has provided information about missing and crashed aircraft.

I can’t see any meaning to this variance in content. The audience (the Chief of Air Staff), one presumes, expects rapid-fire information with minimum distractions. However, it will be of mild interest to those who have studied the Valentich disappearance. Speaking of the Chief of Air, an additional sentence found in the final version, which may have been tailored especially for him, can be found on Page 2 within the “Community Interest” sub-section:

Neither accusation has caused the RAAF serious embarrassment or concern.

Another difference between draft and final versions, which could be easily missed, is within the mention of probable downed space junk. The draft says:

The most recent example known to me occurred in the late 1970s/early 80s when a RAAF SQDLDR was dispatched at short notice to central Queensland..

The final version says:

The most recent example is thought to have occurred in the late 1970s/early 80s when a RAAF SQDLDR was dispatched at short notice to central Queensland.

See that? The passage of text “…example known to me occurred…” and “example is thought to have occurred” is subtly dissimilar. What meaning this has, keeping in mind the audience who was to review this material, is unknown to me. There are many other variances between WGCDR Brett Biddington’s draft policy review and the final product. Significant work would go into detail every single one. Even then, so little meaning can be attributed to many of them that attempting to do so scarcely seems worth the effort some twenty-two years later. In my next, and final, part of this series, I will discuss some of the other pages in the 42 page PDF that makes up this significant release by our Department of Defence.
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      After months of too’ing and fro’ing, I have successfully had the Australian Department of Defence (DOD) declassify and release never-before-seen UFO policy material, and a significant fraction of it is very interesting, to say the least.

But, first, I would like to do what researcher Bill Chalker calls “due diligence” and clarify a few things… Way back in 1984, The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) downgraded its investigative responsibilities in regards to UFO sightings. No longer did the RAAF’s Directorate of Air Force Intelligence (DAFI) base-level officers have to investigate all UFO sightings submitted by the general public. This wasn’t a huge blow, as RAAF officers were not compelled or trained to investigate properly anyway. However, continuing RAAF policy stated that any UFO sighting, or “Unusual Aerial Sighting” (UAS), which appeared to show a defence or security threat would still be investigated. A Department of Defence press release on 2nd May, 1984 stated, in part:

The RAAF in future will investigate fully only those Unusual Aerial Sightings (UAS) which suggest a defence or national security implication. The Minister for Defence, Mr Gordon Scholes, said today that while the RAAF would continue to be the first point of contact, UAS reports not considered to have a defence or security implication would not be further investigated.

Fast forward 10 years, to 1994, and the RAAF’s UAS Policy was downgraded further, to virtually nothing. “Enclosure 1 to Air Force file AF 84 3508 Pt 1 – RAAF POLICY: UNUSUAL AERIAL SIGHTINGS” clearly laid out, once and for all, that the RAAF would not accept or investigate any reports of UFOs events. On January 4th, 1994, RAAF Wing Commander (later Group Captain) Brett Biddington stated, on behalf of the Chief of Staff, Air:

For many years the RAAF has been formally responsible for handling Unusual Aerial Sightings (UAS) at the official level. Consideration of the scientific record suggests that, whilst not all UAS have a ready explanation, there is no compelling reason for the RAAF to continue to devote resources to recording, investigating and attempting to explain UAS.

I have always wondered about this “scientific record”? Likewise, I have often been puzzled why more isn’t known about this period of dying RAAF involvement with UAS. In November, 2013 I asked RAAF officer Group Captain Brett Biddington (ret) about this interesting period. The results of that short interview can be seen on Keith Basterfield’s blog site here.

But what about an official paper trail? The DOD doesn’t conclude a policy without some sort of administrative action and tasking. There is always paperwork. On the 23erd September, 2015 I submitted a Freedom of Information (FOI) request for:

copies of any and all material that was created or used to draft this policy conclusion… …including any briefs; draft copies; memoranda; minutes of meetings; references to secondary material used in decision making processes; loose minutes; interagency correspondence; etc.

On the 21st of December, 2015, I received a 42 page PDF from the Defence FOI desk which certainly contains a never-before-seen administrative records from 1993 that helped formulate the RAAF’s shift away from any UFO investigation. The first item of interest is a facsimile transmission, dated 26th August, 1993, from Wg. Cdr. Brett Biddington at the Directorate of Air Force Policy, Intelligence, Russell Offices, Canberra to either Sqd. Ldr. Wright or Mr Barnett, RAAF Intelligence Office, Melbourne. The “SUBJECT” of the transmission is a handwritten note stating “Draft UAS Policy”. Immediately below is a section called “INSTRUCTIONS/MESSAGE”, under which this brief note is made:

Chris, Draft UAS policy + background info as discussed. Hope this helps as an interim measure. I sense no real problem exists in A block – minor changes only are expected, Regards….

Below is an image of this transmission:


Enclosed with this facsimile is Wg. Cdr. Biddington’s first, lengthy drafting of background information and suggestions which would soon morph into the minimalist 1994 UAS Policy. The first surprise is the security classification stamped top and bottom of every page. Traditionally, Australia’s Defence community assigned one of five levels of sensitivity to records: UNCLASSIFIED, CONFIDENTIAL, RESTRICTED, SECRET and TOP SECRET. The material presented here is stamped SECRET which is, despite what people think, actually very rare for Australian UFO records. And, as we shall see, some of this release still remains SECRET, or, rather, has been redacted, even now in 2015! Still, most of Wg. Cdr. Biddington’s efforts have been released. I will present each page, and focus on some quite notable highlights. It should be noted that each paragraph starts off with a letter indicating what security classification was assigned to that particular section. (U) indicates it is UNCLASSIFIED, (C) indicates CONFIDENTIAL, (R) indicates RESTRICTED and (S) indicates SECRET. Page 1 begins with a paragraph of administrative and clerical text, which gives way to a more interesting second paragraph, which was formally classified CONFIDENTIAL (see above top).

The next page of Brett Biddington’s draft material continues in this rather extraordinary manner:


How fascinating. A full four lines of text are redacted. I will look at what the contents of this hidden material may be in due course. Continuing on, paragraphs 5 and 6, which mention the vanishing of pilot Frederick Valentich, raises a curious point about a logistical benefits of official study of UAS.

Continuing on with the “Suggested Policy” section:


Finally, the last page of Brett Biddington’s draft contains the inevitable “Recommendation” section. Oddly, there may be a typing error here, as he numbers it “12” when it should be, judging by the numbering of paragraphs on the previous page, numbered “13”:


Note on the above last page there is also the listing of an annex titled “Current UAS policy, dated Arp 84” which of course refers to what was then the current UAS policy apparently in need of the complete overhaul that Biddington was prescribing. We’ve seen some of the 1984 UAS material, so I will discuss it only briefly, and further along. For now, what of the above material? The security classification level gave me degree of surprise, but I take the common sense angle: In any lengthy DOD publication, some paragraphs will be classified differently than others, and, indeed, the above material ranged from UNCLASSIFIED to SECRET. But, overall, the publication in its entirety has to be classified at the level of the highest classified paragraph. I have seen bulky US Air Force squadron histories classified SECRET merely because a few lines were classified at that level; but in reality the vast majority of the publication does not warrant this level of restriction. In the case of Brett Biddington’s draft UAS material, it is expected that any such Directorate of Air Force Policy, especially coming out of the Intelligence section, or “AFPOL3”, would have some sensitivities.

That is, if we still lived in 1993….

The redactions that we are interested in here were done under Section 47E of the FOI Act. In one section of the DOD’s final letter to me, it was stated that:

…disclosure of the information under section 47E would prejudice Defence’s ability to obtain similar information in the future and would compromise the ability of the RAAF to complete its mandated role, namely defending Australia and its national interests from the air.

Moreover, another paragraph stated, in regards to the person making the final decision about the documents being redacted:

GPCAPT Wallis is satisfied that the expected effect of disclosing to you material identified exempt under section 47E(d) could have a substantial adverse effect on the proper and efficient conduct of the operations of Defence, in that once the information was made publically available it could divulge areas of capability interest.

So what do we think they may say under that black ink?

Take a look at parapgraph 4, which, again, states:

4. (S) In the past, responsibility for UAS has allowed X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X The most recent example known to me occurred in the late 1970s/early 80s when a RAAF SQDLDR was dispatched at short notice to central Queensland X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

This tells me that the RAAF has been able to use civilian UAS reporting to find, or attempt to find, manmade space junk that has re-entered and crash landed – something absolutely inevitable in a nation large as Australia. Various US Air Force collection memoranda and policy justifications have stated that downed space junk, especially of Soviet or otherwise Eastern Bloc origins are of considerable value. A November, 1961 USAF HQ Intelligence memoranda laid out that crashed space junk was considered “items of great technical intelligence interest” and that some of the duties of specialised intelligence teams were to “expeditiously retrieve downed Soviet Bloc equipment”. The text in our Biddington draft document mentions a RAAF officer having to dispatch to central Queensland, and I presume it is regarding one of the numerous instances when spherical cryogenic fuel containers came down there. There is a possibility the redacted text is referring to something more exciting, like an incident we have no idea about, or an especially large or technically noteworthy piece of space hardware.

A look again at another section of the document that has significant redaction:

7. (S) I think that an extra-terrestrial threat to Australian security is not likely to develop without some foreknowledge from astronomical and other surveillance systems. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X The means by which such searches might be conducted are numerous and will vary with particular circumstances.

I believe this may refer to Australia’s ability to engage in long-range surveillance – either simply atmospheric, or out into space. The RAAF’s Jindalee Over-the-Horizon Radar Network (JORN) was, at the time of this policy change, being developed and, interestingly, Brett Biddington was involved in the implementation of the huge JORN program. It is quite possible that the above redacted material relates to detection of unearthly craft, on the very off chance they should come! If not JORN, then maybe the blacked-out text refers to Australia’s use of US space tracking systems? Or novel height finding radars quietly in use by our armed forces?

So far, I have only had this FOI release in front of me for two days. I am continuing to study it, and, at 42 pages, there is much more yet here. In Part 2 of this series I will focus on the final copy of Brett Biddington’s material, and some other oddities in the release. This is a somewhat major piece of history – that is if you are interested in the official handling of the UFO issue by Australia’s government. Finally, I mentioned above that the draft document contained an annex titled “Current UAS policy, dated Arp 84”. To build or downsize a current policy, the official doing the work must have to hand that paperwork, and, though we have seen much of the earlier 1984 material before, I think it worth a quick look:

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